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Since late 2006, the United States has experi-
enced a decline in the housing market, including 
a large increase in the number of foreclosures. 
Many of these homeowners were faced with 
negative equity positions, while others had taken 
out loans that they were no longer able to af-
ford or refinance. Higher-risk borrowers with 
“subprime” mortgages, loosely defined as a loan 
made with a higher interest rate than a traditional 
loan because the borrower is expected to have 
a relatively higher chance of defaulting, were 
disproportionately affected.
Foreclosures may be both a signal and a cause  
of a weak economy, and concern about the ef-
fects of increasing foreclosure rates on both con-
sumers and financial institutions has prompted 
research into the causes of the recent foreclosure 
wave. Many of those factors developed during 
2003-2006, and include falling or stagnant home 
prices, rising interest rates, lax underwriting, 
predatory lending, fraud, lack of borrower due 
diligence, and underlying economic conditions   
in certain regions. 
In a recent working paper from the Richmond 
Fed, one of the authors of this Economic Brief 
(Smith) and Allen C. Goodman explore another 
potential factor in foreclosure rates: differences 
in state laws regulating predatory lending and 
foreclosure proceedings.1 Noting that default 
rates vary greatly by state, Smith and Goodman 
hypothesize that these variations may be caused 
by variations in state laws, which change the 
costs of foreclosure to lenders. Previous research 
into the effects of legislation on default rates 
has attempted to determine the impact on the 
borrower’s decision to default,2 while Smith and 
Goodman examine the effects of these laws on 
lenders’ underwriting standards and acceptance 
rates. In general, their data suggest that lenders 
have stricter borrowing requirements in states 
where it is more costly to foreclose, which leads  
to lower relative foreclosure rates. 
Smith and Goodman examine two main types of 
state lending laws: those regulating “predatory 
lending” and those regulating the foreclosure 
process itself. Anti-predatory lending laws are 
intended to curb the incidence of dishonest or 
fraudulent lending. The term refers to loans with 
exceptionally high interest charges or unreason-
able or deceptive terms, such as balloon pay-
ments or negative amortization. One of the first 
September 2010, EB10-09
Economic Brief
EB10-09 - The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
The Effects of Local Demographic Characteristics 
and State-Level Legislation on Foreclosure Rates
By Ross Lawrence and Brent C. Smith
Problems in the housing sector have prompted research into the causes  
of default by borrowers. The terms of the loans that were made, the  
characteristics of borrowers, and local economic conditions, among other  
factors, all contributed significantly to differences in default rates. State- 
level legislation may also have played a role by making it more costly for 
lenders in some states to proceed to foreclose on defaulted mortgages. 
Page 1Page 2
such laws was the Federal Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), which restrict-
ed “high-cost” loans. States began enacting similar 
legislation in the late 1990s, although the strictness 
and enforcement of these laws varies greatly by state. 
Supporters of anti-predatory lending statutes argue 
that the regulation helps the market function prop-
erly by assuaging consumer fears about dishonest 
lenders and by guaranteeing that creditors bear 
the cost of any negative externalities caused by 
predatory loans. Critics contend that the laws create 
incentives for credit-rationing and increase the price 
for loans to high-risk borrowers, further reducing the 
amount of credit available to borrowers who already 
had limited access to financing. Research on the 
issue is inconclusive; some studies have found that 
the number of subprime loan originations decreased 
in states with anti-predatory lending laws, while 
in other states the number of originations stayed 
constant or increased. Studies have also shown 
that while the number of subprime loans remains 
unchanged in states with regulation, the number 
of loan applications and denials decreases. Overall, 
more aggressive laws seem to reduce the number of 
highest-risk loans, although some of those loans may 
shift to non-bank institutions. 
The second category of state laws includes those 
overseeing the foreclosure process. While every state 
has laws governing foreclosure proceedings, they 
vary in the amount of redress and protection they of-
fer to both lenders and borrowers. In 21 states, lend-
ers must go through the court system to foreclose on 
a property, which adds an average of five months to 
the process. Several studies indicate that the judicial 
requirement can significantly increase foreclosure 
costs for the lender, and that foreclosure laws can 
affect the costs to borrowers at the time of loan 
origination. Another variable influencing foreclosure 
costs is the type of redemption allowed, statutory 
or equitable. Statutory redemption lengthens the 
foreclosure process by providing borrowers with a 
period of time after a foreclosure sale when they may 
redeem the property by paying the principal balance, 
accrued interest, any penalties or fees, and court 
costs. Equitable redemption, a common-law concept, 
is the right of a borrower to reclaim a property before 
foreclosure by paying all past due mortgage pay-
ments. Additionally, in some states lenders may seek 
deficiency judgments in an attempt to collect any 
balance that remains after a foreclosure sale. 
Financial institutions use the underwriting process 
to minimize their exposure to future defaults—in 
other words, to reduce the anticipated costs arising 
from the nonpayment of a loan. This process is where 
Goodman and Smith believe that state laws govern-
ing default can affect the pricing and number of 
loans offered. 
In states where lenders absorb fewer costs associ-
ated with default, they have an incentive to institute 
more liberal underwriting practices than generally 
would be desirable in higher-cost states. Because 
borrowers are unable to self-select to avoid dispari-
ties caused by location, borrowers in different states 
will face different loan requirements. Based on these 
conditions, Goodman and Smith hypothesize a) that 
laws regulating the time before lenders can execute 
foreclosures influence the rate of foreclosures across 
the market; and b) that the more options and lower 
costs for borrowers to default, the greater the cost to 
lenders. The increased incentive on lenders to tighten 
underwriting standards influences the rate of fore-
closures across the market. 
The authors’ hypotheses rest on several assumptions. 
First, Goodman and Smith assume that foreclosures 
are not costless to the lender, and that the costs can 
be estimated and built into the price of a mortgage. 
Because of differences in state laws, lenders face 
different foreclosure costs depending upon the state 
where the loan originates. Assuming lenders are 
rational and well-informed of the cost differentials, 
they will have a higher acceptance bar for borrow-
ers in states with higher foreclosure rates relative to 
the price that can be legally charged for loans. This 
practice reduces the lender’s exposure in states with 
higher relative foreclosure costs. In theory, lenders 
will accept fewer high-risk applicants in high-cost 
states than in low-cost states. One should therefore 
expect to see fewer foreclosures in states with higher 
costs to the lender.Page 3
Goodman and Smith build two regression models 
using a database of individual loan performance data 
aggregated by zip code to determine the effect of  
location on foreclosure rates. The observations 
include both dynamic data, such as the number of 
loans in default or with prepayment penalties, and 
static data, such as the original purchase price of 
loans or the borrower’s FICO score. The authors also 
include zip code level census data to control for 
the effects of neighborhood on the types of loans 
offered. (Households tend to sort themselves into 
neighborhoods with households of similar charac-
teristics, and mortgage vendors may target different 
loan types to different neighborhoods, or require 
different underwriting standards because of the 
perceived credibility of the neighborhood. These 
tendencies could affect foreclosure rates and distort 
the effects of state legislation in the model.)
The authors also include data at both the state level 
and the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level, 
since some MSAs cross state borders, and some 
states contain multiple MSAs with very different 
housing market conditions (Buffalo and New York 
City, for example). To account for both the state- and 
MSA-level variables, the authors use hierarchical lin-
ear regression (HLR), a statistical technique that can 
be used with “nested,” or multi-level, variables. The 
authors also use ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sion as a basis for comparison. 
Mortgage defaults are a complex problem, and the 
regression equations reflect this with a number of 
independent variables related to home values, loan 
types, and borrower characteristics. Of course, the 
primary variables of interest in this case are laws 
regarding predatory lending and foreclosure pro-
ceedings. The authors use a dichotomous variable 
to differentiate states that do or do not have HOEPA-
type laws, and they use data derived from Freddie 
Mac to construct variables regarding the cost to the 
lender and the total number of days from the bor-
rower’s default through the final disposition of the 
property. Although the relationship is not especially 
strong, there is a positive relationship between time 
and cost, particularly at the extremes of the foreclo-
sure timeline. Variables for redemption (the right of a 
borrower to reclaim the property) and confirmation 
(court review of the sale) are obtained from foreclo-
sure sale Web sites. Both redemption and confirma-
tion lengthen the foreclosure process and presum-
ably increase the cost of foreclosure to the lender. 
Finally, the equations include two different depen-
dent variables for default outcomes: foreclosure 
and real estate owned (REO). A property becomes 
REO when the mortgage lender is not able to sell 
the home at a price sufficient to recover loss due to 
default at auction, and thus takes ownership itself. 
Because a foreclosed property does not necessarily 
proceed to REO, Goodman and Smith distinguish 
between these outcomes in their analysis. They also 
test the sum of foreclosure and REO to reflect the 
cross-sectional nature of the data.
The authors’ supposition is that as it becomes more 
expensive to foreclose, lenders will impose more 
stringent underwriting standards, leading to lower 
default rates. Although it is difficult to tease out the 
effects of various policies, the results do suggest that 
there is a relationship between certain state laws and 
the occurrence of foreclosure. 
In both the OLS and HLR models, the variables 
related to differences in state legislation are statisti-
cally significant. As constructed, the variables related 
to foreclosure proceedings increase the costs to 
the lender, and although the results are not entirely 
consistent, there is a strong association between 
higher costs and lower foreclosure rates. The results 
are more mixed for the impact of HOEPA-like laws. 
In the HLR model, stricter predatory-lending laws do 
seem to reduce the number of foreclosures, although 
the relationship does not hold in the OLS model. The 
variables related to borrower characteristics do sug-
gest that stricter underwriting standards have an ef-
fect. In both models, for example, higher FICO scores 
are related to lower default rates.
While the authors’ primary purpose is to examine the 
effects of state legislation, the data show interest-
ing results in other areas. For example, increasing 
home values over the last several years are positively 
related to foreclosures, but negatively related to REO, Page 4
which indicates that different factors at the state level 
influence foreclosure and the transition of foreclosed 
properties to REO. In the OLS model, median house-
hold income is not a significant predictor of default, 
which suggests that foreclosures are not limited to 
lower-wealth neighborhoods. The percentage of a 
neighborhood that is African-American is related to 
higher foreclosure rates, which suggests that some 
demographic groups may have been disproportion-
ately affected by certain types of mortgage products. 
As one might intuit, higher interest rates—a common 
feature of predatory loans—are positively related to 
higher defaults. 
While Goodman and Smith’s results suggest that 
differences in state laws can help explain differences 
in foreclosure rates, their research also highlights the 
complexity of the foreclosure problem and potential 
responses to it. For example, a 2008 paper by Amy 
Crews Cutts and William Merrill suggests that fore-
closure timelines may alter borrowers’ and lenders’ 
incentives in surprising ways.3 Longer foreclosure 
processes, which Goodman and Smith suggest lower 
default rates, may actually create opportunities for 
borrowers to occupy homes free of charge, thereby 
increasing their likelihood of default. On the other 
hand, states with shorter timelines reduce the incen-
tive for lenders to conduct workouts that enable bor-
rowers to “cure” their loans and bring them current. 
The social costs of foreclosure are many. In a 2005 
paper, Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith cite nega-
tive spillover effects including value loss, tax-base 
erosion, instability in retirement wealth for middle-
income households, and ultimately the economic 
stability of local communities.4 There are tradeoffs 
with any regulation, however. Rules designed to pro-
tect consumers from abusive practices may reduce 
their access to credit, or make it more expensive for 
them to borrow; and lenders’ efforts to protect them-
selves from high-cost foreclosures may lead them to 
sacrifice both efficiency and profit. 
Market interventions often restrict participants’ 
abilities to exercise certain choices deemed undesir-
able or harmful to the public at large. These legisla-
tive initiatives may also restructure the cost-benefit 
calculations of actors involved in the transactions, 
either intentionally or unintentionally. Goodman and 
Smith’s research offers potential explanations of how 
legislation affects mortgage lenders and foreclosure 
rates, and offers a promising avenue for further re-
search into a multifaceted problem. 
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